Introduction
The recent global financial crisis, which started with the US subprime crisis in Building on Fitzpatrick (1983) political risk is due to unwanted consequences of government or sovereign actions on business. These actions may take the forms of industry-and/or firm-level constraints, such as expropriation, restrictions on remittance of profits, and discriminatory taxation. Political risk can also be due to hard-to-anticipate discontinuities in the business environment, which have the potential to significantly affect the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise.
Accordingly in this paper the definition of political risk incorporates not only government actions but also policy uncertainty, whether or not associated with political instability, which encroach on domestic and foreign businesses.
Bilateral investment treaties reduce political risk to foreign investors. They Investment Treaties for example, is defined as "every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk". An investment may take the form of an enterprise; shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;
bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; and futures, options, and other derivatives . 6,7 Therefore, bilateral investment treaties provide political risk guarantees to portfolio equity, private non-guaranteed debt in addition to FDI. They may even provide guarantees to public and publicly guaranteed debt as far as multinational corporations seek guarantees on their loans from host country governments.
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In this paper we empirically examine the influence of bilateral investment treaties' political risk guarantees on capital flows using panel data on middle income 5 Recent empirical studies in the FDI literature show positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI flows (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Egger and Merlo 2007; Neumayer and Spess 2005; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006) . 6 The definition of assets also includes "turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts; intellectual property rights; licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges".
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UNCTAD (2007) identifies four definitions of investment: "asset-based" definition; a "tautological" definition; a "closed-list" definition; and a limiting definition which excludes certain assets and transactions. Most recent bilateral investment treaties have adopted the first definition, which covers every or any kind of assets and typically includes: a) movable and immovable property and any related property rights; b) interests in companies, such as shares, stock, bonds, and debentures; c) claims to money and claims under a contract having a financial value and loans directly related to a specific investment; d) intellectual property rights; and e) business concessions. 8 In discussing determinants of capital flows, Hooper and Kim (2007) point out that opacity in corruption might increase the likelihood of multinational corporations seeking loan guarantees resulting in an increase in capitals inflows.
countries for the period 1984-2011 adopting system GMM estimation methodology.
The paper empirically finds that ratified bilateral investment treaties with OECD countries have a total positive influence on non-guaranteed debt flows and portfolio equity flows.
The paper contributes to the literature in two main respects. First, it examines the influence of bilateral investment treaties beyond FDI to different types of capital flows constituting foreign investment. This has not been examined in the literature before to the best of our knowledge despite the wide definition of foreign investment covered in bilateral investment treaties. In addition, the paper distinguishes between non-guaranteed and guaranteed debt flows, helping to provide an understanding of long-term creditors' responses to political risk guarantees, an issue that has not been explored before.
Second, by accounting for government efforts to reduce political risk through contracting bilateral investment treaties, this paper provides a more realistic and policy-oriented political risk definition than elsewhere in the literature. While political risk has been defined to reflect government actions that can adversely affect businesses, this definition does not take into account government reforms to ameliorate political risk through bilateral investment treaties. 9 We account in the theoretical and empirical models for political risk, political risk guarantees, and the interaction between them.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the determinants of capital flows and the impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI, and highlights literature messages and gaps. Section 3 specifies the empirical model and data. Section 4 discusses the empirical issues and estimation methodology.
9 Signing or ratifying bilateral investment treaties in reality may stem from pressure by domestic and/or foreign investors.
Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes, highlights the policy implications, and identifies issues for future research.
Literature survey
In this section we first explore the determinants of capital flows in the voluminous capital flows literature and then turn to explore the impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. The purpose of this section is to identify the messages and gaps in the literature on which this research builds. 
Determinants of capital flows
The development of capital flows determinants literature largely reflects the increasing financial globalization that has taken place over the past three decades and the roles that external and domestic economic fundamentals play in encouraging or discouraging capital flows. Among the domestic factors, political risk has attracted special attention in the capital flows literature owing to their contribution in triggering the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In addition to those examined factors, a major strand of the capital flows determinants literature explored the role that capital liberalization or controls play in promoting or limiting capital flows. This logic underlies the brief literature survey discussion below.
The determinants of capital flows have been extensively examined in the capital flows literature. Some studies have distinguished between the role of external (push) and domestic (pull) factors (Calvo et al 1996; Fernandez-Arias 1996) . Calvo et al (1996) explain capital flows during the 1990s in terms of external factors to the recipient economy and domestic factors. External factors to the recipient economy 10 A comprehensive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this research.
include declining world interest rates, which improve creditworthiness and reduce default risk in developing countries, global business cycle, integration of world capital markets, diversification of investments internationally, and contagion effects.
Domestic factors include sound domestic monetary and fiscal policies, and trade and capital market liberalization. Similar to Calvo et al (1996 ), Fernandez-Arias (1996 argued that the decline in world interest rates improved creditworthiness and reduced default risk in developing countries, and therefore perceived capital flows as a result of the interaction between external push factors and domestic pull factors.
Over the past three decades of increased global financial integration many governments adopted policies of financial liberalization in order to lure more capital flows and reap the benefits of smoothing consumption, boosting investment, and Wei (2000) . Studies examining the influence on international lending include Kraay and Nehru (2004) , Lane (2004 ), Mina (2006 2011), and Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2006 Going beyond specific institutional influence, Kim and Wu (2008) empirically examine the impact of country risk measured by sovereign credit ratings on capital flows. They find that foreign currency long-term ratings proved to be the most important stimulus for international (as opposed to domestic) capital flows, while local currency long-term ratings had negative impact on international capital flows.
Short-term foreign and domestic currency ratings have detrimental effect on international capital flows.
Bilateral investment treaties and FDI
The influence of bilateral investment treaties on FDI has been examined in the 
Messages and gaps
In summary the brief literature survey of the capital flows determinants highlights that institutional quality or more generally political risk, and the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals and policies matter for attracting capital flows as well as for insulation and recovery from global shocks. More specifically, a high risk of investment expropriation deters both bank loans and portfolio flows. In addition, the FDI literature shows positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI.
There are no studies, to the best of our knowledge, which examine the impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign investment other than FDI. As mentioned in the introduction, foreign investment may take the form of an enterprise; shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; and futures, options, and other derivatives. A positive influence of bilateral investment treaties on debt and equity flows may be viewed as an additional means to promote capital flows. In particular, a positive influence on long-term as opposed to short-term debt may be viewed as an insulation of countries from global financial shocks.
Empirical model and data
The empirical model specification builds on Wei and Wu (2001) , who examine the effect of distortionary corruption on FDI by a multinational firm using a simple optimization model. The multinational firm chooses the level of FDI, which maximizes its after-tax and after-bribery profit. In this paper, we also formulate an optimization model. However, instead of examining the effect of distortionary corruption on FDI, we examine the effect of political risk, political risk guarantees, and the interaction between both of them on foreign investment.
Foreign investors obtain capital in world capital markets. A foreign investor chooses the level of foreign investment, whether equity or credit, she extends to a host country j that maximizes her profit π. The optimization problem can be expressed as:
where is foreign investor's profit, is the flow of foreign investment the foreign investor extends to the host country, is the cost of foreign investment, which is a function of the risk-free world interest rate and a political risk premium , and j=1,…,N. The political risk premium for country j is function of the rate of government expropriation of a dollar of foreign investment and the rate of political risk guarantee of investment, which bilateral investment treaties provide, and the interaction between the two, .
We model political risk premium using two approaches. The first approach considers the premium to be driven primarily by the risk of investment expropriation.
Political risk guarantees interact with expropriation risk and mitigates it. Accordingly the political risk premium can be expressed in specific form as:
The second approach considers the premium to be driven primarily by political risk guarantees. Expropriation risk interacts with the guarantees: If the risk of investment expropriation is high, it may reduce the level of guarantee bilateral investment treaties provide. Accordingly the political risk premium can be expressed in specific form as:
The effects of and on the political risk premium are intuitively expected to positive and negative ( ) respectively, which in turn have negative and positive effects on profits ( . Accordingly, the corresponding empirical models we estimate are given by:
and
where K is the flows of foreign investment, R is the (risk-free) cost of capital, G is the rate of political risk guarantee on investment, X is the rate of government expropriation of foreign investment, GX is an interaction term, Z is a vector of additional control variables, and ε an error term , where is the direct effect of the political risk guarantee and is the indirect effect through X or the interaction between G and X.
K could be debt or equity flows of nonresidents relative to GDP. 14 Unlike other studies examining capital flows, we distinguish debt flows into non-guaranteed debt (private non-guaranteed debt -PNG) and guaranteed debt (public and publicly guaranteed debt -PPG) flows to allow us to examine the influence of political risk guarantees. PNG debt is an external obligation of a private debtor, the repayment of which is non-guaranteed by a public entity. PNG debt flows are net flows of long term nature, calculated as the difference between disbursements and principal repayments.
Long-term debt has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. PPG debt is an external obligation of public sector or of private sector the repayment of which is guaranteed by a public entity. 15 Similar to PNG debt net flows, PPG debt net flows are of long-term nature, calculated as the difference between disbursements and principal repayments.
K could also be equity flows, which are decomposed into FDI and portfolio equity. Portfolio equity, as defined by WDI, includes net inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct investment and including shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors. FDI is investment in equity capital, retained earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, which acquires 10 percent or more of the voting stock in an enterprise operating in a foreign economy. FDI net inflows are the difference between new investment inflows and disinvestment.
R is measured by the 3-month treasury bills rate. We expect an increase in the interest rate would increase the cost of capital, reduce profit, and decrease foreign investment flows. Campion and Neumann (2004) 
Empirical issues and estimation methodology
There are a number of empirical issues that we consider before embarking on A dynamic panel GMM approach is therefore adopted in estimating the empirical model along the line of Arellano and Bond (1991) . 18 Consider the simple empirical model below: 
Although unobservable country effect is eliminated with differencing, there can still be an endogneity bias arising from the correlation between the lagged difference of the dependent variable and the error term. In this case instrumental variables are used.
The difference GMM estimator uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments on the conditions that the error term of the differenced equation is not serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. However, when the dependent variable is highly persistent over time, as in the case of capital flows, the difference GMM suffers weak instrument problem and its asymptotic properties may be affected; both point estimates and hypothesis tests become unreliable (Che et al 2013) .
To address these problems, a system GMM along the lines of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is adopted instead. For system GMM, lagged differences of explanatory variables are used as instruments, assuming the absence of serial correlation in the error term, and between these instruments and the error term. The moment conditions are thus written as: Finally, in identifying the exogeneity or endogeneity of the explanatory variables, Granger causality tests are conducted and variables are identified accordingly.
Empirical results

Sample countries
Appendix A provides information on our sample countries. For the total sample, countries seemed to rely more heavily on debt flows compared to equity flows. PNG and PPG debt flows amounted for more than 0.6 and 1.5 percent of GDP, respectively, compared to 0.15 and 0.16 percent of GDP for FDI and portfolio equity flows, respectively.
A look at individual countries shows that Kazakhstan and Nicaragua had the highest average PNG and PPG debt flows amounting to 7.5 and 10.1 percent of GDP, respectively, while Nicaragua and Latvia had the highest average long-and short-term Libya had the highest real GDP per capita amounting to nearly $7,300.
Guyana had the highest average trade and banking credit amounting to 188 and 157 percent of GDP. Panama reached the maximum score possible (2.44) on financial openness followed by Latvia (2.31). hypothesis of individual unit root for all variables except for real GDP per capita only.
Empirical issues diagnostics and treatment
The second difference of PNG debt flows, the first difference of real GDP per capita and the second difference of the financial openness index are stationary under the three panel unit tests and are used in the empirical model.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Granger causality test results, based on 5 lags to account for persistent relationships, suggest the presence of reverse causality between the dependent variable(s) and the explanatory variables, which we account for in GMM estimation.
The results are reported for 5 lags to account for persistence in capital flows and reflect long-term relationship. As table 2 shows, the null hypotheses that the second difference of PNG flows do not Granger-cause the first difference of real GDP per capita, and banking credit and trade as a percentage of GDP could not be accepted.
The null hypotheses that PPG flows do not Granger-cause banking credit and trade as a percentage of GDP could not be accepted. On the equity side, the null hypothesis that FDI flows do not Granger-cause the 3-month treasury bills rates and ICRG's investment profile could not be accepted. Also the null hypothesis that portfolio equity flows do not Granger-cause the number of ratified treaties with OECD countries and the first difference of real GDP per capita could not be accepted.
Accordingly these variables are included as endogenous variables in estimation in addition to the lagged dependent variable.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
We report p values for the Arellano-Bond and Hansen J test statistics.
Failure to reject both hypotheses indicates consistency of estimates. We also report Windmeijer's (2005) robust standard errors, which provide consistent estimates and correct for finite sample biases found in two-step system GMM.
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Empirical results
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 report the estimation results for PNG, PPG, portfolio equity and FDI flows, respectively. Tables with letter A (B) present the results for empirical model 3 (3'). We introduce the explanatory variables gradually to be able to examine how the influence of political risk guarantees responds to increasing model complexity. Table 3A shows that an improvement in expropriation risk increases PNG debt
PNG and PPG debt flows
flows. 65 percentage points. We should note that such high influence may depend partially on how we account for or count bilateral investment treaties. Table 4A shows that an improvement in expropriation risk decreases PPG debt flows, unlike the positive influence on PNG debt flows. The positive and consistently, statistically significant interaction term suggests however that such negative influence improves as more treaties, and thus higher percentage, with OECD countries are ratified. Similar to the influence of expropriation risk, bilateral investment treaties also have negative influence. However, the statistical significance of the coefficients of bilateral investment treaties and the interaction term is very sensitive to model specification. Economic development has inverse relationship with PPG debt flows; the more developed the country the less PPG debt flows it attracts. Table 5A shows in specifications 2-9 that an improvement in expropriation risk has a surprisingly direct negative influence on portfolio equity flows. It is possible that this negative influence results from the increase in other types of capital flows, in particular PNG debt flows, in response to risk improvement. The negative influence however improves with the increase in ratified bilateral investment treaties, a point we turn to. Table 5B shows positive influence of bilateral investment treaties on portfolio equity flows, which diminishes with improvement in expropriation risk.
Portfolio equity and FDI flows
In both tables a higher level of financial development increases portfolio equity flows. 
Conclusion
The results above highlight a number of interesting points. First, less political risk and more political risk guarantees do not have the same type of direct influence on non-guaranteed debt flows. Non-guaranteed debt flows increase with the improvement in political risk but decreases with more political risk guarantees.
Second, the total (combined) influence of less political risk and of more political risk guarantees each on non-guaranteed debt flows is positive, however. Third, in the case of public and publicly guaranteed debt flows, less political risk and more political risk guarantees share the same type of influence; both reduce debt flows. Fourth, unlike non-guaranteed debt which increases with economic development, public and publicly guaranteed debt decreases with economic development. Fifth, political risk guarantees have positive influence on portfolio equity flows, which diminishes with political risk improvement. Sixth, both financial development and trade openness matter for equity flows, with the former encouraging portfolio equity flows and the latter encouraging Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable calculated as ß 3 +ß 4 X, where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß 3 +ß 4 X, where the sample mean (56.5) of X is used. Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß 3 +ß 4 X, where the sample mean (56.5) of X is used. Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß 3 +ß 4 X, where the sample mean (56.5) of X is used. Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. Windmeijer's robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß 3 +ß 4 X, where the sample mean (56.5) of X is used. 
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